Abstract-The growing volume of mobile data traffic has led many Internet service providers (ISPs) to cap the monthly data usage of their users and to charge overage fees, when the data caps are exceeded. Yet data caps imperfectly capture the reality of heterogeneous data usage over a month-even the same user may have varied requirements from month to month. In response, some ISPs are providing alternative avenues for users to customize data plans to their needs. In this paper, we examine a secondary data market, as for example created by China Mobile Hong Kong, in which users can buy and sell leftover data caps from one another. While similar to an auction in that users submit bids to buy and sell data, it differs from traditional double auctions in that the ISP serves as the middleman between buyers and sellers. Such a market faces two questions. First, can users learn each others' trading behavior well enough for the market to function, and second, do ISPs have a financial incentive to offer such a market? Different users' abilities to trade data depend on others, thus forcing users to not only optimize the amounts of data they bid, but also to learn and adjust for other users' trading behavior. We derive users' optimal behavior and propose an algorithm for ISPs to match buyers and sellers. We compare the optimal matchings for different ISP objectives and derive conditions under which the secondary market increases ISP revenue: while the ISP loses revenue from overage fees, it can assess administration fees and profit from the differences between the buyer and seller prices. Finally, we use one year of usage data from 100 U.S. mobile users to simulate the market dynamics and to illustrate that sustainable conditions for a revenue increase for the ISP can hold in practice.
diversity of mobile data traffic [2] . In response, ISPs have attempted to simultaneously customize mobile data access to allow for different user or application behavior and find ways to limit user demand to available network capacity [3] [4] [5] . While much of this work focuses on technical modifications to network operations, e.g., automatically adapting application usage to network congestion [6] , in this paper we focus on a higher-level concern: is there a market for data usage?
Though different types of pricing do not determine application data demand, ISPs can influence users' data consumption patterns and incentivize users to behave in ways that reduce network congestion [7] , [8] . Pricing is also an important component of perceived user experience: users who expect better network service are willing to pay more for data usage. Thus, different pricing plans can complement other lowerlayer or automated mechanisms for customizing and limiting data usage. In order to do so, these data plans should be able to accommodate different user behavior, e.g., users consume different amounts of data over a month, and the same user's data consumption can change from month to month [9] , [10] . There is then high variability in users' willingness to limit their data usage and potentially prevent excessive network congestion. Most ISPs today have attempted to limit excessive data usage by charging users a fee for a maximum amount of data quota within a month, i.e., a monthly data cap [4] , with additional steep overage fees or throttling for data usage over the cap [11] . Yet this rigid pricing does not take into account usage heterogeneity. We consider an emerging alternative, traded data plans, in this paper.
A. Traded Data Plans
The discrepancy between heterogeneous data usage and fixed data caps has been somewhat mitigated by shared data plans [12] , [13] . Such plans allow data caps to be shared across multiple users and devices; thus, users with a high data demand can reduce the likelihood of exceeding their data caps by sharing a cap with other users who have less data demand. Yet most users share their data caps only with their immediate family members.
Understandably, the majority of the users may not be willing to give away their leftover data caps to strangers, but there is a possibility that they might sell their leftover data. Users with a large data demand could then purchase additional data from other users, thus avoiding ISPs' high overage fees and customizing their own data caps to their needs in each month. Interestingly, ISPs can have an instrumental role in this secondary market, both to enforce the traded data caps in users' bills (e.g., ensuring that buyers are not charged overage fees for their purchased data), and to help buyers and sellers locate one another (e.g., through an exchange platform). China Mobile Hong Kong (CMHK) introduced such a secondary market at the end of 2013 [14] . CMHK's 2cm data exchange platform allows users to submit bids to buy and sell data, with CMHK acting as a middleman to match buyers and sellers, and as a bookkeeping facilitator, to ensure that the sellers' trading revenue and buyers' purchased data are reflected on their monthly bills.
Traded data plans have been studied in [1] and [5] , with [15] Intuitively, we would expect ISPs to lose revenue with the secondary market: instead of purchasing overage data from the ISP, users can potentially buy data directly from other users at lower prices. However, the ISP's role as a middleman between the buyers and sellers allows it to extract revenue from buyer-seller transactions. 1 
In this work, we derive the optimal economic behavior of the buyers, sellers, and ISP, as well as propose algorithms to learn data trading behavior. We show that all three parties can benefit from the option of a secondary market, and validate our analysis with simulations over a one-year dataset of 100 users' monthly usage from a U.S. ISP.

B. Related Work
Auction solutions have been proposed to form a selforganizing market that incentivizes users to participate in data trading. Most previously studied data auctions aim to mitigate network congestion [16] , [17] , while recent works propose variants of data auctions by leveraging user behavior. The trading mechanism proposed in [18] allows users to sell their data by becoming hotspots for others, but user mobility can jeopardize the viability of such a market. With the ISP's involvement, the data transactions in our work can be done remotely. Considering a similar trading model, the author in [19] discusses users' decisions on their usage at different times of the billing cycle. We argue that users will adjust their decisions over the billing cycle depending on their abilities to buy and sell data.
Conventional two-sided matching is applied in the literature mostly for allocating resources to users. For instance, secondary users are matched to desirable spectrum from primary users in cognitive radio networks [20] , [21] . In a general wireless setting, matching enables assignments between operators and small cells as well as between small cells and users [22] , [23] . However, these resources are only held on a temporary basis, so the user incentives are different from those in data trading. Moreover, most two-sided auction works do not consider the incentives of an auction middleman.
C. Modeling User and ISP Behavior
We suppose that each seller (resp. buyer) can submit a bid to the secondary market consisting of the volume of data that the user wishes to sell (or buy) and the unit price to accept (or pay). The ISP then matches buyers and sellers to each other. While the ISP determines the amount of data that users can buy or sell, buyers always pay their bid prices for any data bought, and similarly sellers always receive their bid prices (any differences between the amounts paid and received go to the ISP). Thus, users have little incentive to lie about the prices that they are willing to accept (sellers) or pay (buyers).
1) Choosing Optimal Bids (Section II):
When choosing how much data to bid, users must account for its effect on their usage in the rest of the month, which also depends on their unknown future usage preferences. For instance, buyers may use more data if they can buy data in the secondary market. However, users might not be able to trade their entire bid amount; thus, if they benefit more from trading a very small amount of data rather than an amount near the optimum, they may bid a smaller amount of data. We show that it is optimal for users to assume they can trade their entire bid and derive the amount of data to bid as a function of the bid price, accounting for its effect on future usage.
The prices that users bid affect whether their bids can be fully matched: for instance, some buyers may not pay the high price set by a seller. However, users do not know a priori how much of their bids can be matched, as they do not have information about the ISP's matching algorithm or the other users' bids. They can, however, learn from their previous trading experience and adjust their bid prices accordingly. We first examine ISPs' matching policies before proposing an algorithm for users to dynamically increase their likelihood of being matched in the secondary market.
2) Matching Buyers and Sellers (Section III):
The ISP matches users so as to optimize its revenue, including volumebased administration fees and "bid" revenue, or the price difference between buyers who pay higher price and sellers who accept lower prices. Since buyers will buy more data in the secondary market due to its low prices as compared to ISP overage fees, the ISP can collect substantial administration fees, which can exceed its primary market revenue and compensate for a loss of overage revenue in the secondary data market. Moreover, buyers' purchased data comes from sellers' existing data caps, thus leading to less overall traffic. We compare the users matched when the ISP optimizes its different types of revenue and derive conditions under which the ISP gains revenue as compared to the primary market.
3) Market Dynamics (Section IV): As users participate in more matchings, they can more reliably estimate the amount of data they can buy or sell at given prices. This process forms a feedback loop between users and the ISP as users learn more about other users' bids and the ISP's matching algorithm. We propose an algorithm for users to adjust their expectations of being matched and change their bid prices accordingly. We simulate the day-to-day market interactions over a one-year dataset of monthly usage for 100 U.S. ISP customers in Section V. We show that the buyers, sellers, and ISP can mutually benefit from the secondary market. We conclude the paper in Section VI. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
II. USER TRADING BEHAVIOR
The secondary market consists of L buyers who purchase data from other users and J sellers who sell their leftover data. In this section, we discuss how sellers (Section II-A) and buyers (Section II-B) choose their bids to maximize their utilities, 2 and then consider how users choose whether to become a buyer or seller in Section II-C. Since users can choose whether or not to participate in the secondary market, they can benefit from having the option of participating. We now introduce notation and behaviorial considerations common to both buyers and sellers.
Since . We define a buyer l's bid by an amount of data b l and a price π l that she is willing to pay. Similarly, each seller j bids a price σ j for an amount of data s j . Figure 1 shows how buyers' bids are matched to sellers' bids and how the ISP receives revenue in the secondary market. In this example, the buyer purchases her entire bid. The seller's income is split between the administration revenue paid to the ISP and the revenue kept by the seller. The ISP receives bid revenue from the difference between buyer and seller prices. The bid prices are lower bounded by an administration fee ρ per unit data sold that the ISP imposes on the sellers, as in CMHK's traded data plan [14] . Although the administration fee could also be charged to the buyers, it would give them less incentive to join the secondary market; however, sellers can always deduct this fee from their income and still be guaranteed a positive profit if π l ≥ ρ. 3 Thus, sellers will not accept a buyer l's price if π l < ρ. The prices are upper-bounded by the ISP's overage fee p per unit data: buyers prefer to buy data from the ISP at price p rather than accept seller j 's price if σ j > p.
Without knowing other users' bids and the ISP's matching algorithm, each user decides the optimal amount of data to trade by maximizing his or her utility, given a price to accept or pay. Absent the cost or revenue from trading data, users gain utility from consuming data. We use the standard α-fair utility functions with α ∈ [0, 1) to model the usage utility from consuming c amount of data [24] , [25] :
where θ > 0 is a normalization constant representing users' relative utility from their data consumption and payment to sellers (resp. income from buyers). A higher θ also scales up the marginal return of usage utility, encouraging users to consume more data. The strict concavity of this α-fair utility function captures the diminishing utility increase for heavy data consumption: as users consume more data, they receive less satisfaction from each additional unit of data consumed. As α increases, users' demands are more sensitive to the increase in usage utility.
A. Sellers' Optimal Bids
Since sellers can submit bids before the end of the month, they do not know their exact eventual monthly usage. Thus, we suppose that each seller j 's realized usage c 
, and his revenue equals (σ j − ρ)s j , so the expected utility of the seller when selling s j data is given by:
We note that (2) is always increasing in the price σ j . Thus, sellers always bid higher prices, subject to their ability to be matched to buyers (cf. Section IV). Given σ j and the distribution f , the seller chooses s j (σ j ) ∈ [0, o s j ] so as to maximize the utility (2). Though it is possible that the seller will not be able to sell all of his data, it is still optimal for the seller to bid the utility-maximizing s j as long as
Thus, the seller always increases his utility by bidding the maximum amount of data up to the optimal amount. Though we formulate this utility maximization problem in terms of a general distribution f , to provide analytical insights, we show below some illustrative distributions for which E(U s j | s j ) is concave. 
1) Example Distributions:
We first consider the extreme case of a delta distribution, where a user's realized usage for the month only has one possibility: for instance, some sellers may only use the minimum data (i.e., f is a delta distribution centered at d s j − o s j ), while others may use up their entire data caps in the month, (i.e., f is the delta distribution centered at d s j − s j ). This distribution can model a seller whose usage is consistent from month to month, e.g., someone who mainly uses cellular data while commuting to and from work, and otherwise uses WiFi. In the former case, E(U s j | s j ) is linear in s j and the seller bids s j = o s j amount of data. In the latter case, the utility function in (2) can be written as:
Thus, we compute the optimal bid as
In most cases, the seller's usage will fall somewhere between these two extremes. We thus follow [12] in supposing that it follows a uniform distribution f (c 
We now observe that s j is increasing in σ j , as we could intuitively expect:
is concave. To solve for s j satisfying (4), we use the nonlinear Perron-Frobenius theory for Algorithm 1. We refer the reader to [26] , [27] for more details of the nonlinear PerronFrobenius theory and its applications in wireless networks.
Lemma 1: Algorithm 1 converges geometrically fast to the fixed point s j in (4) from any initial point
Since the right-hand side of Lemma 1's condition decreases in the utility scaling factor θ s j , we expect it to be satisfied for relatively small θ s j . For such θ s j , the user has relatively low utility from usage, as we would expect from a seller. We formalize this intuition in Section II-C.
Algorithm 1 Sellers' Utility Maximization
Initialize s(0) ∈ (0, o s ). 1) The j th seller updates the data caps to be sold:
2) Normalize s j (k + 1):
B. Buyers' Optimal Bids
Like the sellers, buyers do not exactly know their future usage. Thus, we take the buyer's monthly usage c (Figure 2) . Hence, the expected data usage utility of the lth buyer purchasing b l amount of data is given by
so the expected utility of the lth buyer is
Since (5) is decreasing in π l , buyers wish to bid at lower prices, subject to their ability to be matched to sellers (Section IV). As with the seller, the buyer will always bid her utility-maximizing ; these buyers will therefore not purchase any data in the market. Other buyers will use up their entire data caps, i.e., their distributions f will be the delta distribution centered at d b l +b l . The utility function under this delta distribution is given by
yielding the optimal data bid
In most cases, however, the buyer's usage will lie between the two extremes; as for sellers, this distribution models users with unpredictable data usage over the month. We thus consider f to be the uniform distribution
. We first show that the utility in (5) is concave:
Proposition 2: The utility function of the lth buyer
distribution. Then, the optimal bid b l satisfies:
We also note that b l is a decreasing function of the price, as we would intuitively expect:
We again use the nonlinear Perron-Frobenius theory in [26] to solve for b l in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Buyers' Utility Maximization
The lth buyer updates the amount of data to be purchased:
Lemma 2: Algorithm 2 converges geometrically fast to the fixed point b l in (7) from any initial point
We thus observe that the algorithm converges for buyers with high utility scaling factors θ b l . We show in the next section that buyers will likely satisfy this condition.
C. Selling or Buying Data
Users choose to become a buyer or seller based on the utilities they can achieve from buying or selling data. Thus, if
the user becomes a seller: the user's maximum utility from selling data (assuming all data is sold at the maximum price) must be higher than the maximum utility from purchasing data (assuming all data is bought at the minimum price). 4 If (8) is reversed, the user becomes a buyer instead.
To illustrate this decision, we suppose that the user's usage follows the delta distribution. We then derive the following necessary condition on users' utility scaling factor θ in the usage utility function (1):
Corollary 3: A user sells data when the scaling factor θ satisfies θ ≤θ and buys data otherwise, wherê
Thus, users with high utility scaling θ become buyers, while those with low θ become sellers.
III. ISP TRADING POLICIES
The ISP will match buyers and sellers so as to optimize its revenue, subject to constraints imposed by user bids. We analyze the optimal matching in Section III-B before considering whether the resulting revenue exceeds that of the primary data market in Section III-C.
A. ISP Optimization
The ISP will often encounter sellers' and buyers' bids that are not exactly aligned: for instance, if a seller offers more data than any single buyer is willing to purchase. To facilitate the matching of such bids, we suppose that the ISP can match multiple buyers to multiple sellers. Since the ISP acts as a middleman, this flexibility is transparent to all users. All required accounting can be done internally by the ISP.
We denote the matching between buyers and sellers with a j ) entry of represents the percentage of the lth buyer's demand (i.e., amount of data bid) b l that is satisfied by the j th seller's data supply s j ; thus, l j b l represents the amount of data that buyer l purchases from seller j . Note that the ISP can take any bids from users (e.g., s j = s j (σ j ) and b l = b l (π l )) in the matching optimization.
1) Matching Constraints: The ISP's matching is primarily constrained by the buyer and seller bids. Buyer l's bid of a price π l and amount of data b l constrains the ISP matching in two ways: first, the buyer will buy at most b l amount of data, leading to the feasible set
We thus suppose that the buyer will accept matchings in which her bid is only partially matched (Section II). Second, the buyer's price π l gives an upper bound on the average purchase price of her data. We assume that the buyer will pay this bid price π l for all data purchased; the amount paid, π l j l j b l , must be at least as much as the data cost specified by sellers' bid prices (i.e., a cost σ j l j b l for each seller j ). Mathematically, we have the feasible set
If the total amount paid by the buyer exceeds the data cost, the ISP keeps the excess as part of its bid revenue. Similarly, seller j 's bid of a price σ j and amount of data s j implies that he will sell at most s j amount of data:
In return, the total money paid by all buyers for seller j 's data l l j b l π l must be at least the cost of the data σ j l l j b l : Thus, the ISP must choose ∈ B ∩ ∩ S ∩ , which can be written as a set of linear constraints as in (10)- (13). Intuitively, if sellers and buyers bid sufficiently low and high prices respectively, they can be matched to at least one other user. We derive these price thresholds using (11) and (13):
Proposition 3 (Price Feasibility): If seller j sells data to at least one buyer ( l l j b l > 0), then his selling price σ j is not higher than all buyers' purchasing prices:
Analogously, if buyer l purchases data from at least one seller (i.e., j l j > 0), then her purchasing price is not lower than all sellers' selling prices, i.e., π l ≥ min j σ j .
2) ISP Objective: The ISP's objective in choosing a matching is to maximize its revenue from the secondary market. We identify two sources of ISP revenue: "administration revenue" and "bid revenue" (Figure 1) . The ISP's revenue from the administration fee is proportional to the volume of data traded, i.e., ρ l, j l j b l . To calculate the bid revenue, we add the differences between each buyer's payment and each seller's income: 
The parameter ω trades off between administration revenue and bid revenue; its effect is our next subject of discussion. 5 We use to denote the optimal solution to (14) . We then characterize the optimal solution affected by the ISP's choice of ω and user bids in the discussion below. 5 We will show in Section III-C that the expected total data consumed in the secondary market decreases with the volume of data traded. Thus, maximizing the administration revenue is equivalent to minimizing the cost of handling network traffic as well as to maximizing the ISP's profit.
We note that, if a seller bidss j > s j , this does not improve his chance of having l l j b l = s j at the optimal point of (14), since buyers may bid lower than the price that the seller is willing to accept or they may not have a large enough demand to accommodate the seller's offer. If buyers do have sufficient demand to meet the seller's bid, the seller may have s j < l l j b l =s j , yielding suboptimal utility for him. Similarly, buyers do not bid more than their optimal amounts b l .
B. Matching Buyers and Sellers
Solving (14) with ω = 0.5, i.e., weighting the bid revenue and administration revenue equally, maximizes the ISP's total revenue in the secondary market. However, changing ω can lead to different matching outcomes. The ISP can thus incorporate other considerations into its matching objective.
Taking ω < 0.5, i.e., preferentially weighting the bid revenue, is equivalent to reducing the administration fee ρ. When the ISP preferentially weights its bid revenue, it attempts to match buyers with high prices to sellers with low prices, increasing the difference in the amount paid by buyers and sellers. In contrast, when maximizing its administration revenue, the ISP wishes to maximize the total amount of data traded. Thus, for higher ω (i.e., preferential weight to administration revenue) the ISP might match a seller to buyers with both higher and lower prices; buyers' prices π l would then average out to equal the seller's price σ j , and the seller would be able to trade more data than if he had only been matched to buyers with higher π l . Indeed, we can derive a necessary condition on ω under which such matchings occur:
Proposition 4 (Matching Feasibility): If π l < σ j and
then the ISP will not match buyer l to seller j . If ω = 1, then ω never satisfies (15) , and low-price buyers can be matched to sellers with higher prices. The amount matched of a user's bid thus depends on both the other users' bids as well as the ISP's matching objective. Figure 3 illustrates the effect of varying ω with the matching outcomes for five users. When the ISP preferentially weights bid revenue, i.e., ω is small, only the seller with the lowest price (Seller 1) and the buyer with highest price (Buyer 3) are matched. However, as ω increases, more users are matched; in fact, for ω > 0.44, buyers 1 and 4 both purchase data, even though their bid prices are lower than all the sellers' bid prices. Furthermore, as ω increases, the administration revenue ρ j l l j b l increases, but the bid revenue
Even for ω = 1, some buyers and sellers may not be matched to any user. We can in fact derive price thresholds for buyers and sellers above (resp. below) which all the buyers (sellers) can trade some data, and below (above) which no buyer (seller) trades any data:
Proposition 5 (Price Competition): Suppose that the sellers are sorted with price ascending (σ j +1 ≥ σ j ) and the buyers are sorted with price descending (π l+1 ≤ π l ). Then is a block matrix with all the non-zero entries in the northwest corner: 1) If the mth buyer is not matched with any seller ( j m j = 0), then all buyers l > m (i.e., whose bid prices are lower than that of buyer m) are also unmatched: all the entries below an all-zero row in are zero. 2) If the nth seller is not matched with any buyer ( l ln = 0), then all sellers j > n (i.e., whose bid prices are higher than that of seller n) are also unmatched: all the entries to the right of an all-zero column in are zero. The buyers and sellers compete with one another on the basis of price. Buyers paying higher prices and sellers accepting lower prices thus have more opportunities to trade data.
C. Comparison to the Primary Market
In the absence of a secondary market, the buyers would buy overage data from the ISP instead of purchasing from other users. Thus, in the secondary market, the buyers purchase more data due to lower prices, while sellers consume less data to gain revenue by selling data to buyers. Since the ISP receives administration revenue in proportion to the amount of data sold in the secondary market, its revenue might be larger than the revenue earned in the primary market. We mathematically formulate these differences in Table I , which compares users' utilities, expected total data consumed, and ISP revenue in both markets. Figure 4 illustrates ISP and user behavior in the primary and secondary markets for the simplified case of one buyer and one seller. In the primary market, the buyers purchase data from the ISP at the maximum price p. The lth buyer thus maximizes her utility by purchasing b l ( p) data from the ISP. Hence, the revenue of the ISP in the primary market is p L l=1 b l ( p). Sellers do not participate in the primary market, which is equivalent to letting σ j = ρ in the secondary market: at this price, the seller does not earn any revenue from selling data and loses utility if he sells data; therefore, the j th seller's utility in the primary market is calculated when s j = 0. Hence, the expected amount of users' data caps consumed in the primary market is In Figure 4 , the one seller and the one buyer are matched when their prices align (σ j = π l ). Thus, in the secondary market, the lth buyer purchases b l (π l ) amount of data, where π l < p. Since b l (·) monotonically decreases with respect to the price (Corollary 2), b l ( p) < b l (π l ) and the buyer bids more data in the secondary than she would purchase in the primary market. However, not all sellers' and buyers' bids are always fully satisfied, i.e., the constraints in (10) and (12) may not be tight at optimality. For example, the amount of data offered by the seller in Figure 4 is less than the amount of data bid by the buyer, and then the buyer's bid will be only partially satisfied, i.e., l j b l (π l ) < b l (π l ). However, she may still purchaseb l ( p) amount of overage data from the ISP, witĥ b l ( p) chosen by maximizing the utility:
leading to (cf. the proof of Proposition 6)
The buyer is then expected to consume the amount of
in the secondary market, where after trading, the buyer's distribution of data usage f may change. For instance, we have
if it is a uniform distribution. On the other hand, if only part of seller j 's bid is matched, he is expected to consume the amount of
. Hence, the expected total data consumed in the secondary market is computed as in Table I .
Although buyers would purchase more data in the secondary market, the data is transferred from sellers to buyers. Even though buyers may still purchase overage data from the ISP when J j =1 l j < 1, we can see from (17) that they purchase less overage data than in the primary market. This is because after trading, buyers purchase overages starting from larger data caps:
Proposition 6 (Traffic decrease): If user usage follows a uniform distribution, the expected total data consumed in the secondary market is less than that in the primary market. Furthermore, if the users' usage distributions are delta distributions as in Sections II-A and II-B, they always use up all of the data that they have after trading, and thus the statement in Proposition 6 also holds. From Table I , we can see that the expected data consumed in the secondary market is a piecewise linear decreasing function of
e., the volume of data traded, and that the data trading can in fact avoid the extra traffic due to overage purchases if buyers can purchase at least the amount of overage data that they would buy in the primary market in the secondary market. Thus, in order to account for the traffic cost in (14), we can simply adjust the weight of the administration revenue.
We notice that ISP revenue when offering data trading consists of administration revenue, bid revenue, and the buyers' overage purchase if their bids are not fully matched, while ISP revenue in the primary market only has the buyers' overage charge. However, the unit price of the overage data is higher than the price that the buyers pay to the sellers, leading the buyers to purchase more data in the secondary market than they would in the primary market. Thus, although the ISP loses revenue from overage fees, it may gain more revenue from the administration fees and bid revenue. If we suppose the best matching result, i.e., all constraints (10)- (13) are tight, the secondary market may allow the ISP to recover the revenue lost from the primary market:
Proposition 7 (Revenue benefit): A necessary condition for the ISP to earn more revenue in the secondary market than in the primary market is
For instance, if the buyers' future usage distributions are delta distributions as in Section II-B, then
, and the ISP can earn more revenue in the secondary market. Proposition 7 show that the administration fee has an impact on the ISP revenue, and it should not be set too low.
IV. DYNAMIC DATA TRADING
A sustainable secondary market must allow buyers and sellers to submit new bids at any time, thus necessitating the ISP to run multiple matchings in a given month. Moreover, buyers and sellers can actively learn from each matching outcome: for instance, if a seller is not matched to any buyer, this seller can lower his price in the next bid to attract buyers. 6 We incorporate these initial prices and price adjustments responding to the matching outcome in the following dynamics, which are formalized in Algorithm 3:
1) Users can submit their bids to the ISP at any time during the month. Initially, any users who are joining the secondary market for the first time choose π l (0) and σ j (0). They then calculate the optimal amounts of data to bid b l (0) = b l (π l ) and s j (0) = s j (σ j ) as in Algorithms 1 and 2. Optimistic buyers (resp. sellers) might choose their initial prices as π l (0) = ρ (resp. σ j (0) = p), though buyers and sellers would likely have to raise and lower their prices respectively before they could be matched. Risk-averse sellers and buyers, on the other hand, would respectively abide by the minimum and maximum prices to ensure that they will be matched.
Other users would leverage their past experience in prior months, choosing a price in [ρ, p]. 2) Upon receiving bids from at least one seller and one buyer, the ISP runs the matching optimization (14) . The participants in each iteration k may be different: users with their bids fulfilled in the last matching outcome,
, will quit the matching, and new users may join the data trading. The ISP can update all user bids that it receives before rerunning the matching. Thus, the ISP must run many matchings over a month. As such, 
Algorithm 3 Data Trading Dynamics
At k = 0, the j th seller initializes σ j (0) and s j (σ j (0)), and the lth buyer initializes π l (0) and
2) The ISP computes (k + 1) by solving (14) with
sellers updates the bid price and amount of data:
buyers updates the bid price and amount of data:
end if 5) New sellers and buyers submit bids to the ISP: A new seller submits bid:
end while the number of matchings can vary from month to month depending on how frequently users submit bids as well as how fast their bids are fulfilled. 3) Users respond to the matching outcome from the ISP.
In each iteration k, if only a portion of the bid is matched, the buyers and sellers increase and decrease their prices by
They then recompute the amounts of data to bid with these new prices and submit the new bids to the ISP. Users can set based on their transaction history and their risk preferences: a larger changes the price more, increasing the likelihood of being matched but lowering their utilities.
V. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
A. Trading Dynamics
We now analyze the data trading dynamics in Algorithm 3 with a five-user example. In Figure 6 , we suppose that new users enter the market at the third time slot. One new seller submits a 2GB bid with a price higher than the other sellers' highest price; at the same time, one new buyer submits a 2GB bid, with a price lower than the other buyers' lowest price. These prices reflect the fact that new participants do not have the experience to realistically estimate the amount of data they can buy or sell at different prices. However, by adjusting their prices the users adapt quickly: the new seller and buyer finish their trading within three time slots.
B. Experiments With User Data
We now simulate Algorithm 3 using real-world data usage. Our data comes from 100 mobile users of a U.S. ISP from January to December 2013. The data contains in-network RADIUS records at a session level for each user and their monthly data plans (i.e., data caps and overage fees).
We classify the users as sellers and buyers using (9) . Each user is assumed to have a uniform distribution of future usage. Figure 7(a) shows the distribution of buyer and seller bids over all twelve months; we see that sellers' bids are generally much smaller than buyers', as some buyers bid an enormous amount of data (e.g., for regular HD video streaming). However, there are fewer buyers than sellers. In each month, the users keep trading as described in Algorithm 3 until either sellers' or buyers' bids are all met. We do not consider the case that buyers may purchase overage data if their bids can only be partially satisfied (except in Figure 8 ).
We calculate the total bid and administration revenue and the resulting total traffic in the network for each month, and compare them to those of the primary market in Figures 7 and 8 respectively. For the purpose of simulation, we suppose a uniform distribution for user usage in both primary and secondary markets. As expected, Figure 8 shows that overall network traffic in the secondary market is reduced compared to the primary market. In most months, the ISP's administration revenue alone is larger than the revenue from the primary market due to a large increase in sellers' and buyers' bids matched (Proposition 6). In a few months, e.g., June to September, the primary market yields more revenue and interestingly, traffic in the secondary market drops more: although the sellers do not bid enough data to completely satisfy buyers' demand in the secondary market, they fulfill the buyers with the amount of their overage purchase in the primary market, leading tob l ( p) = 0. We can also observe from Figure 7 that the gap between the total revenue and administration revenue (i.e., the bid revenue) in the secondary market is slightly larger when ω = 0 as in Figure 7 (b) than when ω = 1 as in Figure 7 (c). We observe a similar pattern for the gap between the total amounts of network traffic in the primary and secondary markets as in Figure 8 : at ω = 0, the ISP explicitly maximizes its bid revenue and makes less effort to maximize the total amount of data traded. Figure 9 shows the total utilities, the utilities of the buyers and the utilities of the sellers in the primary market and secondary market. As we would expect, the utilities of the sellers and buyers in the secondary market are always larger than those in the primary market. The amount of this differential, however, varies from month to month.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mobile data trading brings forth new challenges in network economics, since traded data plans in the secondary market affect how users and the ISP behave strategically in conjunction with pricing in the primary market. We first derive the optimal amounts of data in users' bids, depending on the bidding prices that sellers and buyers choose to bid in the secondary market. We take into account uncertainty in users' usage and the amounts of data caps that they need. We then establish a necessary condition under which a user will choose to buy or sell data in the secondary market.
The ISP matches the buyers and sellers in the secondary market by solving a linear program to maximize its revenue subject to users' bid constraints. We compare the optimal matchings when bid or administration revenue is emphasized and derive a necessary condition under which the ISP gains revenue in the secondary market as compared to the primary market. Furthermore, we show that the total amount of data consumed in the secondary market is less than that of the primary market, thus benefitting ISPs' operational costs, but that user demands are better matched to their preferred data caps at the prices that they are willing to pay. With dynamic matchings over multiple times in the month, we examine how users adapt their bids over time to increase the chance of being matched. Finally, we simulate these dynamics over one year of usage data from a U.S. ISP, demonstrating a unique and sustainable market for trading mobile data that is beneficial both for the ISP and for users who desire customized pricing schemes.
APPENDIX
A. Nonlinear Perron-Frobenius Theory in [26] Let · be a monotone norm on R L . For a concave mapping f : R L + → R L + with f (z) > 0 for z ≥ 0, the following statements hold. The conditional eigenvalue problem f (z) = λz, λ ∈ R, z ≥ 0, z = 1 has a unique solution (λ * , z * ), where
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: Taking the second-order derivative of E(U s j | s j ) in (2) with respect to s j , we have:
Next, we show that (o s j ) decreases with o s j by taking the first-order derivative of (o s j ), given by:
where the inequality holds due to the inequality of arithmeticgeometric means that
C. Proof of Corollary 1
Proof: Consider two prices for seller j , σ 1 j and σ 2 j , with σ 1 j < σ 2 j . Then from (4), the optimal amounts sold s j satisfy which implies that h (s j ) ≤ 0. Therefore, h(s j ) is concave so that g(s j ) is a concave self-mapping. Furthermore, the normalization at Step 2 of Algorithm 1 is a monotone norm constraint of s j . Then, the nonlinear Perron-Frobenius theory (cf. Appendix A) can be leveraged for the algorithm design.
i.e., the self-mapping function at Step of Algorithm 2. Hence, 
{π l }, this completes the proof.
J. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: We form the Lagrangian for (14) by introducing the dual variables Z ∈ R 
Taking first-order derivative of (21) with respect to l j and setting it to zero, we have the following equation at optimality:
If ∃l, j such that l j > 0 and σ j > π l , we have Z l j = 0 and , which leads to the inequality:
M. Proof of Proposition 7
Proof: Suppose we have the best matching result by solving (14) , which means all constraints (10)- (13) are tight, then we have 
